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Abstract
We build a dynamic model with endogenous middle class development, human capital accumulation
and policy choices, in order to analyse the interactions between the optimal policies implemented by the
rulling elite and the key drivers of economic growth in the presence of elite rivalry. We consider that: (i)
the speciﬁc policy choices depend on economic and political incentives of the elite; (ii) the individuals'
decisions regarding their childrens' education are endogenously determined by speciﬁc economic and
political factors. Our results suggest that, contrarily to the economically motivated policies, the politically
motivated policy choices imply inneﬁcient economic outcomes and limit the development of the middle
class and human capital accumulation. The results also show that higher middle class and human capital
accumulation growth rates can lower the degree of elite rivalry by reducing the level of the optimal tax
rate, increase public investments in education and yield positive changes in all economic outcomes.
1 Introduction
Successful economic performance has been traditionally associated with the implementation of a spectrum of
supply- and demand-oriented policies, designed to support the key sectors of economic activity and provide
a strong foundation for sustainable economic growth. The vast experience gathered from numerous coun-
tries shows that physical and human capital accumulation, middle class development and implementation of
∗Universidade do Minho, Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE), Escola de Economia e Gestão, 4710-057
Braga, Portugal. Corresponding author. e-mail: esochirca@eeg.uminho.pt
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eﬃcient growth-enhancing policies are fundamental economic and social factors contributing to this objec-
tive. These factors, on their turn, are crucially determined by the establieshed economic and socio-political
environment.
In this paper we examine the interaction between middle class development, human capital accumulation
and policy choices in the presence of elite rivalry. Regarded as a negative form of political competition, elite
rivalry is generally associated to (both economic and political) competition for power between the political
elite and other political groups, aimed at keeping the rulling elite in oﬃce and in control for as long as
possible. In this case, policy choices are determined by the goals pursued by the political elite and not by the
general interest or by economic eﬃciency considerations, compromising long-term investments and leading
to poor aggregate economic performance (see, for example, Alesina & Rodrik, 1992, Alesina & Perotti, 1994,
Dixit & Londregan, 1995, Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006, Acemoglu, 2006, Sochirca et al., 2017).
In particular, we analyse the two-way relationship between elite rivalry and two major growth engines
- middle class development and human capital accumulation. First, we want to see how the presence of
elite rivalry conditions the growth of the middle class and the accumulation of human capital. Second, we
examine in what way higher growth rates of middle class and human capital inﬂuence the economic and
political ineﬃciencies generated by the presence of elite rivalry; we also identify the factors which, in our
analytical framework, can determine the magnitude of that inﬂuence.
With this objective, we develop a dynamic model with endogenously determined human capital accumu-
lation, demographic changes and policy choices. The main features of the model are based on both previous
theoretical research and recent empirical evidence on the relationship between institutions, middle class and
economic growth. The analytical framework builds on the model in Sochirca et al. (2017), in which elite
rivalry translates into excessive increases in the tax rate (as in, e.g., Acemoglu, 2006, 2009). In the present
model, we enrich the setup by speciﬁcally considering that changes in demographic structure are endoge-
nously determined. They are deﬁned, on the one hand, by the endogenous individual decisions regarding
the oﬀspring level of education and, on the other hand, by the policies endogenously determined by the
rulling elite. The resulting demographic structure will then deﬁne the elite's probability to maintain control
of politics. Endogeneising demographic structure together with educational and policy choices allows us to
analyse the above-referred important aspects of the interaction between middle class development, human
capital accumulation and policy choices in the presence of elite rivalry.
From an empirical perspective, the analysis performed in this paper is relevant essentially for two main
reasons. First, existing data show that, although the middle class growth has slowed down in the developed
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countries, it has been increasingly more intensive in emerging economies (Kharas, 2010; Young, 2013; Sum-
mers, 2016; Milanovic, 2016), including some of the most populous countries in the world, such as China,
India and Brazil.1 This implies that the share of the middle class in the world population is increasing consid-
erably. Our theoretical model provides the analytical framework for determining some of the implications of
this globally important process. Second, existing empirical data is not clear on how higher growth rates of the
middle class interact with policy eﬃciency, especially in what regards public goods provision (Loayza et al.,
2012; Desai, 2015; Birdsall, 2015; Kharas, 2017). Our theoretical model allows examining this interaction as
well.
The obtained results suggest that in the presence of elite rivalry, i.e. in a situation of politically motivated
excessive tax rates, production and human capital accumulation are discouraged, the incentives for educating
children are reduced and, consequently, the development of the middle class is limited. These negative eﬀects
are aggravated with the increase in the degree of elite rivalry. Our results also suggest that increases in
the growth rates of the middle class and human capital accumulation have an overall positive eﬀect on the
economy, as they contribute to lowering the degree of elite rivalry and reducing policy ineﬃciencies in the
medium-long term. The magnitude of this eﬀect tends to depend positively both on the fraction of tax
revenues that the political elite invests in public education and on the these investments' eﬀectiveness in
reducing the individual cost of educating children.
The structure of this paper is the following. In Section 2 we present the model settings and derive
equillibrium output, wages, human capital accumulation, endogenous demographic changes and the optimal
policies of the rulling elite. In Section 3 we derive and discuss the results regarding the interaction between
optimal policies, the size of the middle class and human capital accumulation in the presence of elite rivalry.
The conclusions are summarized in Section 4.
2 Model settings
We develop a dynamic model with human capital accumulation and demographic changes in a two-sector
economy. The population consists of three classes of agents: unskilled workers, skilled workers, and the
1The middle class is generally growing in the developing countries, but the numbers are particularly high in Asia, where it is
estimated to come to represent two-thirds of the global middle class population by year 2030. On the contrary, in the developed
north-american and european economies, the middle class is large but stagnating (Kharas, 2017).
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political elite. Given the traditionally observed strong association between the level of human capital and
social-class membership, we consider that the skilled workers constitute the middle class (see, for example,
Doepke & Zilibotti, 2005; Doepke & Zilibotti, 2008; Goldthorpe & McKnight, 2004; Lopez-Calva & Ortiz-
Juarez, 2011).2 We denote each group by U , M and P , respectively, and assume that each has a discount
factor equal to β ∈ (0, 1).
The ﬁnal good, Y , is produced by two substitute technologies - the skilled and unskilled productive
activities, respectively. While both types of workers participate in (exclusively) either skilled or unskilled
production, we assume that the role of the elite in the economy is purely political. More speciﬁcally, the
elite holds the political power in the society, makes speciﬁc policy choices, and is not directly involved in
the production of the ﬁnal good. We also assume that, in each period, skilled and unskilled workers are
diﬀerentiated by the human capital stock they accumulate. The latter depends, on the one hand, on their
parents' choice regarding their education and, on the other hand, on the policies adopted by the political
elite. Demographic changes in our model are then deﬁned by the endogenous changes in the relative size of
the skilled workers' group, under the inﬂuence of speciﬁc political and economic factors. Our model thus
endogenously links political choices, demographic transformations and economic growth.
2.1 Productive activities and wages
Two substitute technologies can be used for producing the ﬁnal good - the unskilled technology employing
unskilled workers, and the skilled technology employing skilled (i.e. middle-class) workers. The output for
each technology, Y u and Y m, is given by:
Y ut = (K
u
t )
α(Ut)
(1−α) (1)
Y
m
t = (K
m
t )
α(Ht ·Mt)(1−α) (2)
where the upper-scripts u and m refer to the unskilled and the skilled production technology, respectively.
As equations (1) and (2) show, each production technology uses technology-speciﬁc physical capital, Kut or
Kmt , and unskilled or skilled labour, given by the amount Ut and Mt, respectively. Additionally, the skilled-
technology production is augmented by the level of human capital, Ht, accumulated by the middle class. The
shares of physical capital and labour in production are given by α and 1− α, respectively.
2Thus, throughout the paper we use the terms skilled workers and middle class as synonimous.
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We assume that the model starts with a working population U0 > 0 and M0 > 0, and that at each t the
output tax rate, τt, applied for raising state revenues, and the capital stocks, K
u
t and K
m
t , used in ﬁnal-good
production, are endogenously determined in t − 1. Taxes are progressive in the sense that they are applied
only to the ﬁnal good produced by the skilled workers. Thus, in each t, a fraction τt of the skilled production,
Y mt , is collected as tax revenues by the political elite.
Denoting by ki ≡ KiGi the capital stock per unit of human capital (for i = u,m and Gu = Ut and
Gm = HtMt), equations (1) and (2) can be written in the intensive form, y
i ≡ f(ki) = (ki)α. Following
Acemoglu (2009), we assume that taxes are set and announced by the elite before the production decisions
on the capital stocks and the amount of labour are taken,3 and derive the optimal capital stock per unit of
human capital for the unskilled and skilled technology:4
ku∗ =
(
β−1 + δ − 1
α
) 1
α−1
(3)
km∗ =
(
β−1 + δ − 1
α(1− τt)
) 1
α−1
(4)
Then, the technology-speciﬁc net output can be written as:
Y ut = Ut ·
(
β−1 + δ − 1
α
) α
α−1
(5)
Y mt = (1− τt) ·Ht ·Mt ·
(
β−1 + δ − 1
α(1− τt)
) α
α−1
(6)
From expressions (4) and (6) we can see that the tax rate reduces the output of the skilled workers in two
ways. On the one hand, it implies that a part of output will be transferred to the state; on the other hand,
it lowers the incentives to employ higher levels of km.
Assuming competitive labour markets, both unskilled and skilled workers are paid their marginal product
for the labour they supply (inelastically) to produce the ﬁnal good. Accounting for the above derived capital
3 As we will show in Subsection 2.3, the output tax is endogenously determined depending on the speciﬁc incentives of the
political elite.
4 We also consider that in each period t a fraction δ of capital depreciates.
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stocks per unit of human capital, (3) and (4), wages at time t for unskilled and skilled workers are given by:
wut = (1− α) ·
(
β−1 + δ − 1
α
) α
α−1
(7)
wmt = (1− τt) · (1− α) ·Ht ·
(
β−1 + δ − 1
α(1− τt)
) α
α−1
(8)
Given the negative eﬀect of τ on the skilled-technology output, it is straightforward that the tax rate will
also have a negative impact on the wages of skilled workers, as shown in equation (8).
2.2 Human capital accumulation and demographic change
Each skilled worker's human capital stock at time t + 1 results from both private and public resources,
which were devoted to its accumulation in the previous period. In particular, the knowledge or the human
capital accumulation function, Ht+1, is given by:
5
Ht+1 = w
γ
t E
φ
t (9)
Equation (9) shows that the accumulation of human capital depends, on the one hand, on the amount
of parental income invested in children's education, wγ , and, on the other hand, on the public investments
in education by the political elite, Eφt . Referring to any government expenditures aimed at improving
educational quality and infrastructure, and at providing equality of access and opportunity, Et is determined
by a proportion of tax revenues collected by the elite from the skilled productive activities. Parameters
γ ∈ (0, 1) and φ ∈ (0, 1), deﬁning the corresponding contributions of private and public investments to
human capital accumulation, are assumed exogenous.
Moreover, the aggregate amount of human capital will also depend on the dimension of the middle class,
who in fact are the ones accumulating knowledge in the economy. On its turn, the dimension of the middle
class is determined by the parents' decisions on whether their children will become skilled or unskilled workers;
and this choice depends on the additional eﬀort that parents are willing to make in order to educate their
oﬀspring.
Following Barro & Becker (1989)and Acemoglu (2009),6 we consider that a representative individual's
5Similar speciﬁcations for the human capital accumulation function (based on empirical evidence) can be found in Lucas,
1988; Card & Krueger, 1992;Meghir & Palme, 2005; Carneiro et al., 2010; Sochirca et al., 2017.
6 Extensions of the fertility choice model in Barro & Becker (1989) can be found, for example, in Tamura (1996) and Strulik
(2004).
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life-time utility depends on three main factors: own consumption; the number of children and their future
income, determined by their level of education; and the costs of rearing children to be skilled versus unskilled
workers.7 Formally, the utility function of a representative individual in t can be written as:8
cβt
[
wt+1 · nt+1 − 1
2
(ϕ0 · (1− et) + ϕ1 ·Ht+1 · et) · n2t+1
]
(10)
where ct is the (discounted) consumption of the ﬁnal good by the individual, nt+1 is the number of
reared children in t,9 wt+1 is their income in t + 1,
10 ϕ0 and ϕ1 are parameters related to the costs of
having unskilled and skilled children respectively, and et is the eﬀort exerted for educating children. The
cost of having unskilled children, ϕ0, is ﬁxed and here normalized to 1. The cost of having skilled children
is assumed to be directly proportional to the level of human capital, Ht+1, necessary for working with the
skilled production technology, and inversely proportional to the investments in public education, such that
ϕ1 = (ξEt)
−1. This captures the idea that public investments in education can reduce the private burden of
educational costs, which is particularly relevant for the unskilled parents who decide to educate their children
(and, being more ﬁnancially constrained than the skilled parents, are more dependent on public investments
in education).11 We also consider that, regardless of the human capital level in the economy, raising skilled
children is more costly than raising unskilled children. That is, ϕ1 > ϕ0, which implies that ξEt < 1.
A representative individual can exert either the eﬀort et = 0 or et = 1, that is, she can decide to
have unskilled or skilled children, respectively.12 The optimal number of oﬀspring is then determined by
maximizing the individual utility function. With cβt normalized to 1 and recalling equations (7) and (8), the
optimal number of unskilled and skilled children will be given by:13
nut+1 = (1− α) ·
(
β−1 + δ − 1
α
) α
α−1
(11)
7Henceforth, we will refer to rearing children to become skilled or unskilled workers, simply as having skilled or unskilled
children.
8The cost of having children (who will become either skilled or unskilled workers) is also assumed to be convex in order to
reﬂect the idea that the cost of raising an additional child is increasing in the number of children.
9Note that the number of children in period t is denoted with the subscript t+ 1 to reﬂect the idea that they will determine
the adult population in t+ 1.
10That is, when they become either skilled or unskilled workers.
11See, for example, Banerjee & Newman, 1993; Galor & Moav, 2004; Foellmi & Oechslin, 2008
12This dichotomic presentation of the exerted eﬀort is a simpliﬁcation adopted in order to keep the model analytically treatable.
In reality, this eﬀort is continuous and the distinction between a skilled and an unskilled worker in some cases may not be so
clear. For example, a more detailed modelling approach could assume that there exists a threshold below which workers are
considered to be unskilled.
13Note that, similarly to production decisions, the optimal number of skilled children, nmt+1 is decided after observing the tax
rate announced by the elite for the next period, τt+1.
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nmt+1 = (1− τt+1) · (1− α) · ξEt ·
(
β−1 + δ − 1
α(1− τt+1)
) α
α−1
(12)
As equations (11) and (12) show, contrarily to the optimal number of unskilled children, nut+1, the optimal
number of skilled children, nmt+1, depends on the elite's ﬁscal and public education policies, τ and E . Note
that nmt+1 will determine Mt+1, i.e. the size of the middle class (the number of skilled workers) in t + 1,
and, together with nut+1, the pattern of demographic change. Thus, the size of the middle class and the
demographic changes will also be endogenously aﬀected by the elite's policy choices regarding τ and E. In
the following sections we discuss in more detail various implications of speciﬁc policies implemented by the
elite.
2.3 Optimal policy and elite rivalry
A key objective of this paper is to analyse whether the elite's optimal policy choices depend on the
development of the middle class and human capital. Therefore, in this section we derive the optimal policies
implemented by the elite, keeping in mind the discussion and results from Section 2.2.
When deriving the optimal policy, a fundamental question is to distinguish the type of incentives, i.e.
economic or political, which will deﬁne the elite's optimal choice. Diﬀerent incentives will lead to speciﬁc
policy choices with diﬀerent outcomes in terms of economic eﬃciency (Alesina & Rodrik, 1992; Persson &
Tabellini, 1992; Dixit & Londregan, 1995; Rodrik, 1999; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001; Acemoglu, 2006). On
the one hand, policies based primarily on economic considerations should improve economic performance
and promote economic growth. In the framework of our model, such policies are expected to strengthen the
middle class, contribute to human capital accumulation, and increase the ﬁnal output (and wages) produced
by skilled workers. Such policies will also beneﬁt the elite, enabling them to collect higher tax revenues.
On the other hand, policies based primarily on political incentives will have a negative impact on the key
economic outcomes. This may happen when a stronger middle class is perceived by the elite as a direct
threat to its political dominance, implying that concerns about keeping political power in the future will
predominate over economic eﬃciency considerations. In such political economy context, elite rivalry eﬀects
will be generated. We consider each of these two scenarios, i.e. the absence and the presence of elite rivalry,
and derive the elite's optimal policy choice for each scenario.
The ﬁscal policy of the elite is deﬁned by the choice of the tax rate, τt ∈ (0, 1), and of public investments in
education, Et. The latter are given by the fraction θ of the collected tax revenues. Given that the parameter
θ ∈ (0, 1) is assumed exogenous in the model, the elite's choice of Et is conditioned by the previously chosen
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τt, which determines the amount of tax revenues that the elite will collect. Therefore, in this section, we
focus on the derivation of the optimal ﬁscal policy, τ . We leave the discussion of the ﬁscal policy eﬀects on
public investments in education and on the main economic outcomes for Section 3.
As in Sochirca et al. (2017), we consider that every period t, the elite maximizes the current value of
its revenues net of expenses, and, in the presence of political incentives, also the endogenous probability of
remaining in power in the next period. Formally, we can write the maximization problem of the elite when
choosing the tax rate τt as:
V p(P ) = max
τt
{T pt − Et + β [(1− ρt(τt))V p(P ) + ρt(τt)V p(M)]} (13)
where:
i)V p(P ) and V p(M) represent the utility of the elite when itself and the middle class, respectively, hold
the political power, such that V p(P )− V p(M) > 0;14
ii) T pt represents the tax revenues of the elite, given by:
T pt = τt ·Ht ·Mt
(
β−1 + δ − 1
α(1− τt)
) α
α−1
(14)
iii) Et represents the public expenditures in education, corresponding to:
Et = θ · T pt (15)
iv) ρt(τt) is the probability that the elite loses political power to the middle class in period t. In this
paper, the probability ρt(τt) is endogenous, and given by:
ρt(τt) =
nmt
nut
= ξEt−1 (1− τt)
1
1−α ∈ [0, 1] (16)
As equation (16) shows, the probability of political power shifting from the elite to the middle class in
period t is given by the ratio between the optimal numbers of skilled and unskilled children in t−1. Recalling
that this ratio determines the middle class and the unskilled workers groups in period t,15 this probability
speciﬁcation captures the idea that the likelihood of the elite to lose power in t increases with the relative
size of the middle class. Moreover, given that both nmt and n
u
t depend on the respective future wages (see the
14Given that in each individual period t the positive diﬀerence between V P (P ) and V P (M) can not be excessive, we consider
that V P (P )− V P (M) < 1 .
15See footnote 12.
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derivation of equations (11) and (12)), ρt also implicitly depends on the economic power of the middle class.
Thus, as the middle class becomes larger and more powerful, the probability that the elite will be removed
from power increases.
Equation (16) also illustrates how the policy choices of the elite inﬂuence the likelihood of maintaining
political control. On the one hand, a higher current tax rateτt lowers ρt, as it allows the elite to limit both
the number and economic power of skilled workers in period t (see equations (8) and (12)). On the other
hand, higher public investments in education in the past, Et−1, represent a threat to the elite's control of
political power, given that a higher Et−1 both increases the skilled workers' wages and reduces the cost of
rearing skilled children, thus contributing to a higher nmt .
Optimal policy choice in the absence of elite rivalry
In the absence of elite rivalry, the elite is not concerned with the future distribution of political power
when choosing the optimal tax rate. That is, ∂ρt∂τt = 0 in the maximization problem (13) and thus the ﬁrst
order condition is given by:
∂V pt (·)
∂τt
=
∂T pt
∂τt
− ∂Et
∂τt
= 0
Considering equations (14) and (15), the above ﬁrst order condition yields the following optimal solution
for the output tax in period t:
τ∗t = 1− α (17)
This level of τ maximizes the elite's revenues in period t, as it corresponds to taxing at the peak of the
Laﬀer curve. The elite will not choose a lower value of τ because in this case it would lose part of potentially
available revenues. Also, the elite will not choose a higher τ , since it would considerably reduce production
and, consequently, the tax base.
Given that the tax rate τ = 1 − α is chosen subject to economic and not political considerations of the
elite, it also does not generate economic ineﬃciencies.16
Optimal policy choice in the presence of elite rivalry
In the presence of elite rivalry, the elite cares about the probability of losing political power and uses
ﬁscal policy to inﬂuence ρt. In this case, the ﬁrst order condition becomes:
16For a more detailed discussion of this result, see Acemoglu (2006) and Sochirca et al. (2017).
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∂V pt (·)
∂τt
=
∂T pt
∂τt
− ∂Et
∂τt
− β ∂ρt
∂τt
[V p(P )− V p(M)] = 0
where
∂Tpt
∂τt
, ∂Et∂τt and
∂ρt
∂τt
are calculated based on equations (14), (15) and (16). This yields the following
expression for the optimal output tax rate under elite rivalry, τERt :
τERt = 1− α+
α · θ1−θ · ξ ·
(
τt−1 · (1− τt−1) α1−α
) · β [V p(P )− V p(M)] · (1 + gHt )−1 · (1 + gMt )−1
1 + θ1−θ · ξ ·
(
τt−1 · (1− τt−1) α1−α
) · β [V p(P )− V p(M)] · (1 + gHt )−1 · (1 + gMt )−1 (18)
Denoting by Υt ≡ θ1−θ · ξ ·
(
τt−1 · (1− τt−1) α1−α
) · β [V p(P )− V p(M)] · (1 + gHt )−1 · (1 + gMt )−1, equation
(18) can be rewritten as:
τERt = 1− α+
α ·Υt
1 + Υt
(19)
Inspecting equations (18) and (19), the following three results can be highlighted. First, given that
0 < α·Υt1+Υt < 1, the optimal tax rate set in elite rivalry conditions is strictly higher than the optimal tax rate
without elite rivalry, τ = 1 − α. This by itself is not a new result, as the same was veriﬁed in Acemoglu
(2006) and Sochirca et al. (2017). The intuition for this is simple and is related to the fact that the elite
will tax above the economically eﬃcient level of 1 − α in order to weaken the middle class and increase the
probability of remaining in power.
Second, expression (18) is a non-linear non-homogenous diﬀerence equation, in which τER in t depends
on τER in t − 1, a result that is new. This implies that there is an inter-temporal coherence in the elite's
ﬁscal policy, given that the elite must consider the tax rate applied in the previous period in order to set
the optimal tax rate in the current period. In fact, this is a rather usual policy-making practice in most
countries, as policy-makers will consider the last period's tax rate when ﬁxing or adjusting the tax rate for
the next period.
Third, the optimal tax rate in each t depends on the growth rates of human capital accumulation and of
the middle class, gHt and g
M
t , both endogenous in our model. This is also a new result. Thus, the current
analytical framework allows us, not only to examine how the elite's optimal policy choices aﬀect economic
performance and outcomes, but also to analyse how the optimal policies are themselves inﬂuenced by the
engines of endogenous economic growth. We will discuss these interactions in more detail in the next section.
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3 Interaction between optimal policies, the middle class and human
capital accumulation under elite rivalry: results and discussion
In this section we discuss how economic growth, driven by human capital accumulation and the devel-
opment of the middle class, and policies implemented by the elite interact in a context of elite rivalry. In
particular, in Section 3.1 we consider the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on the key variables of the model in a context
of elite rivalry. In Section 3.2 we analyse the reverse causality eﬀects, that is, how the policies implemented
under elite rivalry change when the middle class becomes stronger and the level of human capital in the
economy increases.
3.1 Policy eﬀects on economic outcomes under elite rivalry
We summarize in Proposition 1 the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on economic outcomes under elite rivalry:
Proposition 1: A higher tax rate under elite rivalry will reduce the tax revenues collected by the
elite, T p, the amount of public investments in education, E , the wages of the middle class,
wm, human capital accumulation, H, and the number of skilled children, nm .
The proof for this proposition is veriﬁed by the partial derivatives of T pt , Et, w
m
t , Ht+1 and n
m
t with respect
to τt.
17 Using equations (14), (15), (8), (9) and (12), the partial derivatives are:
∂T p
∂τ
= H ·M ·
(
β−1 + δ − 1
α(1− τ)
) α
α−1
·
(
1− ατ
(1− α)(1− τ)
)
∂E
∂τ
= θ ·H ·M ·
(
β−1 + δ − 1
α(1− τ)
) α
α−1
·
(
1− ατ
(1− α)(1− τ)
)
∂wm
∂τ
= −Ht ·
(
β−1 + δ − 1
α(1− τt)
) α
α−1
∂H
∂τ
= φ · Eφ−1 · ∂E
∂τ
· (wm)γ + γ · (wm)γ−1 · Eφ · ∂w
m
∂τ
17To simplify the notation, the index t will be dropped from the expressions presented in this section.
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∂nm
∂τ
= −ξE ·
(
β−1 + δ − 1
α(1− τ)
) α
α−1
It is easy to see that all these partial derivatives are negative for any τ > 1 − α. This implies that, in the
presence of elite rivalry, tax revenues, public investments in education, middle-class wages, human capital
accumulation, and the number of skilled children will be strictly lower than in the absence of elite rivalry,
since τER > 1− α.
The intuition for these results is the following. Increasing the tax rate above the level of τ = 1 − α will
reduce the tax revenues collected by the elite, since in this case they will be taxing beyond the peak of the
Laﬀer curve. Nevertheless, the elite still prefers a higher tax because this decreases their probability of being
removed from power. The negative eﬀect on public investments in education (which represent an exogenous
fraction of the collected tax revenues) is then straightforward. Because higher tax rates lower the production
incentives and output for the skilled-technology, they will also reduce the middle-class wages. On their turn,
lower public investments in education and wages - both employed to invest in human capital - will reduce the
accumulation of knowledge in the economy. Finally, higher taxes also lower the number of skilled children
and the size of the middle class - on the one hand, rearing a skilled child becomes more costly due to lower
public investments in education; on the other hand, the expected return to skilled labour in the future will
be reduced due to the decrease in middle-class wages. Thus, educating children will be economically less
attractive.
Taking into account that skilled labour and human capital accumulation are the main forces that drive
aggregate production (see equations (1) and (2)), taxes increased by the presence of elite rivalry will negatively
aﬀect economic growth.
3.2 Eﬀects of the middle-class and human capital growth rates on optimal policy
under elite rivalry
Having examined how the elite's optimal choice of the tax rate aﬀects their investments in education and
the key economic outcomes, we now turn to the reverse causality analysis.
Recall that the optimal tax rate under elite rivalry, τER, is given by the non-linear non-homogeneous
diﬀerence equation (18). Here, we are not interested in ﬁnding a classical diﬀerence equation solution, that
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is, in obtaining an expression for the tax rate τER as a function of t. Instead, we are interested in analysing
the behaviour of τER with respect to the endogenous factors that deﬁne it, i.e. the growth rates of the
middle class and of human capital accumulation. We divide this analysis in two parts: ﬁrst, we will analyse
the eﬀects of the two growth rates on the optimal ﬁscal policy and, second, we will analyse their eﬀects on
the elite's public investments in education.
3.2.1 Eﬀects on the optimal ﬁscal policy, τER
We state in Proposition 2 the eﬀects of gM and gH on the optimal ﬁscal policy.
Proposition 2: Higher growth rates of middle class and of human capital accumulation, gM and
gH , will reduce the level of the optimal tax rate set by the elite in the presence of elite rivalry.
This analysis is performed for the steady-state level of τER, i.e. considering in equation (18) that τER ≡
τt = τt−1. Consequently, (18) becomes an implicit equation and thus, to take the partial derivatives of τER
with respect to gM and gH , we use the implicit function theorem. Let us deﬁne F (·) as:
F (·) = τER − (1− α)− α ·Υ(τ
ER)
1 + Υ(τER)
(20)
with Υ(τER) ≡ θ1−θ · ξ ·
(
τER · (1− τER) α1−α ) ·β [V p(P )− V p(M)] · (1 + gH)−1 · (1 + gM )−1 (see equation
(18))
By the implicit function theorem, we have that ∂τ
ER
∂gj = − ∂F (·)/∂g
j
∂F (·)/∂τER (where j = H, M).
Taking the respective partial derivatives yields:
∂F (·)
∂τER
= 1−
α ·Υ ·
(
1−α−τER
(1−α)(1−τER)
)
τER(1 + Υ)2
> 0, given that τER > 1− α
∂F (·)
∂gH
=
α ·Υ
(1 + gH)(1 + Υ)2
> 0
∂F (·)
∂gM
=
α ·Υ
(1 + gM )(1 + Υ)2
> 0
Thus, from the implicit function theorem, we can infer that ∂τ
ER
∂gH
= −⊕⊕ < 0 and ∂τ
ER
∂gM
= −⊕⊕ < 0.
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This means that the optimal tax rate tends to be lower when the middle class and human capital grow
rapidly. In fact, when the key drivers of aggregate production are growing at higher rates, the skilled-
technology production is more intensive. During this phase, the tax base in the economy also grows more
intensively, which enables the elite to collect higher tax revenues. These will increase even more if the elite
reduces the tax rate.18 This represents a strong economic incentive for the elite, which, in this speciﬁc context,
will prevail over its political interests. In fact, when the tax rates are initially high, i.e. whenτ = τER > 1−α,
the probability of losing power is already relatively low. Therefore, a further increase in the tax rate in order
to (marginally) reduce the probability of losing power is less valuable for the elite than an increase in their
tax revenues generated by a reduction of τER during an intensive phase of economic growth. Thus, higher
middle class and human capital accumulation growth rates contribute to lowering the tax rate level, even in
the presence of elite rivalry.
Additionally, we can also examine how the magnitude of the above veriﬁed reduction in τER induced by
higher gM or gH depends on speciﬁc parameters of the model. We are particularly interested in analysing how
this magnitude is aﬀected by the fraction of tax revenues that the political elite invests in public education,
θ, and by these investments' eﬀectiveness in reducing the individual cost of educating children, ξ. In order
to do that and using the above-derived expressions (by the implicit function theorem), we take the partial
derivative of the absolute value of ∂τ
ER
∂gj (with j = H, M) with respect to parameters θ and ξ. Denoting
|∂τER∂gj | by Ψj we have:
∂Ψj
∂θ
=
α · (τER)2 · (1 + Υ) · (1−Υ)
(1 + gj)
[
τER · (1 + Υ)2 − α ·Υ ·
(
1−α−τER
(1−α)(1−τER)
)]2 · Υθ(1− θ)
∂Ψj
∂ξ
=
α · (τER)2 · (1 + Υ) · (1−Υ)
(1 + gj)
[
τER · (1 + Υ)2 − α ·Υ ·
(
1−α−τER
(1−α)(1−τER)
)]2 · Υξ
Both partial derivatives are positive if Υ < 1. Recalling that Υ(τER) ≡ θ1−θ · ξ ·
(
τER · (1− τER) α1−α ) ·
β [V p(P )− V p(M)] · (1 + gH)−1 · (1 + gM )−1, we can see that the condition Υ < 1 is always satisﬁed for
values of θ ≤ 0.5. Thus, when the political elite does not invest in public education signiﬁcantly more than
50% of its tax revenues,19 we can conclude that the magnitude of the reduction in τER induced by higher
gM or gH becomes more pronounced when the fraction of tax revenues invested in public education and the
18 A corollary of the analysis in Section 3.1 is that, under elite rivalry, a lower tax rate increases tax revenues.
19Note that, the condition Υ < 1 is also satisﬁed for some values of θ > 0.5, given that the remaining compenents of Υ(τER)
all assume values below 1.
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eﬀectiveness of these investments in reducing the individual cost of educating children increase.
3.2.2 Eﬀects on the public investments in education, E(τER)
Proceeding similarly to the above analysis in Subsection 3.2.1, here we take the partial derivatives of E
with respect to gH and gM to determine the eﬀects of human capital accumulation and middle class growth
rates on the elite's public investments in education. We sum up these eﬀects in Proposition 3 as follows:
Proposition 3: Higher growth rates of middle class and of human capital accumulation, gM and
gH , will increase the elite's public investments in education in the presence of elite rivalry.
Using the implicit function theorem and composite derivation, and recalling that, when τ > 1−α , ∂E
∂τER
< 0,
∂τER
∂gH
< 0 and ∂τ
ER
∂gM
< 0, we have:
∂E
∂gH
=
∂E
∂τER
· ∂τ
ER
∂gH
> 0
∂E
∂gM
=
∂E
∂τER
· ∂τ
ER
∂gM
> 0
Both partial derivatives are positive, which means that public investments in education will be higher
when middle-class and human capital accumulation growth rates are high, even under elite rivalry conditions.
Here, the line of reasoning is similar to the intuition for Proposition 2. In particular, the increase in the tax
revenues collected by the elite (induced, on the one hand, by the growth of the middle class and of human
capital accumulation and, on the other hand, by favouring economic versus political incentives) will also
increase public investments in education, given by a fraction of those revenues.
Recalling that in the presence of elite rivalry a lower tax rate will induce positive changes in all economic
outcomes, higher values of gH and gM also contribute to reducing the ineﬃciencies in the elite's optimal
policy choices generated in the presence of elite rivalry.
The model thus predicts that the growth and development processes that the countries undergo, and that
are characterized by episodes of intensive middle class and human capital growth, contribute to lower the
degree of elite rivalry and reduce policy ineﬃciencies in the medium-long term.
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4 Conclusions
In this work we develop a dynamic model with endogenously determined human capital accumulation,
demographic changes and policy choices, building on Acemoglu (2009) and Sochirca et al. (2017). Our main
objective is to analyse the interactions between the optimal policies implemented by the elite, the development
of the middle class and human capital accumulation driving the process of economic growth, in the presence
of elite rivalry.
In this extended model, production, wages, human capital accumulation and the optimal policy choices of
the elite are determined endogenously. Contrarily to Sochirca et al. (2017), in this model we also endogeneize
the size of the middle class. Both unskilled workers and the middle class are considered to compose the total
labour force producing the ﬁnal good. We let both the unskilled and skilled workers decide the future social-
class membership of their children, subject to the (endogenous) inﬂuence of speciﬁc economic and political
factors. This allows us to examine the endogenous demographic transformations generated by changes in the
middle class. Thus, this model provides a framework for, not only identifying the eﬀects of ﬁscal and public
education policies on the key variables of the model in a context of elite rivalry, but also for analysing the
reverse causality eﬀects, namely how the policies implemented under elite rivalry change when the middle
class becomes stronger and human capital accumulation in the economy increases.
One general conclusion of this model, which is in line with the results in related literature, is that economic
considerations in optimal policy choices imply more eﬃcient outcomes. On the contrary, the consideration
of political interests has distorting economic eﬀects induced through an excessive tax rate set by the elite to
weaken the middle class and increase the probability of remaining in power. That is, in the presence of elite
rivalry, the implemented policies are economically ineﬃcient, and these ineﬃciencies are aggravated with the
increase in the degree of elite rivalry.
Our framework also generates several results that are new in the literature. First, in the presence of elite
rivalry, the current tax rate depends on past tax levels, implying that there is an inter-temporal coherence
in the elite's optimal ﬁscal policy. In fact, this result ﬁnds suﬃcient support in the usual policy-making
practices of most countries, by which the last period's tax rate(s) will be usually considered when ﬁxing the
tax rate(s) for the next period. Second, in the presence of elite rivalry, the model yields an optimal tax
rate that depends on the endogenously derived middle class and human capital accumulation growth rates.
This particular result allows us to understand how the optimal policies under elite rivalry are themselves
inﬂuenced by the considered engines of endogenous economic growth.
In particular, we ﬁnd that the optimal tax rate set under elite rivalry tends to be lower when the middle
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class and human capital grow rapidly. This is due to a more intensive skilled-technology production and the
subsequent more intensive increase of the tax base in the economy, which presents additional tax revenues
opportunities for the elite. And when the tax rates are already high (i.e. above the economically eﬃcient
level), the strong economic incentive of the elite to collect higher tax revenues prevails over their political
incentive to increase the probability of maintaining political power. Thus, even under elite rivalry conditions,
the political elite will choose a lower tax rate.
We also ﬁnd that higher growth rates of the middle class and of human capital accumulation have a
similar positive eﬀect on public investments in education as well. On the one hand, this is due to increased
tax revenues collected by the elite and, consequently, to increased public investments in education, represented
by a fraction of those (higher) revenues; on the other hand, this positive eﬀect is further enhanced by the
eﬀect of a lower tax rate.
Finally, we also ﬁnd that the magnitude of the positive inﬂuence of higher middle class and human capital
growth rates tends to depend positively both on the fraction of tax revenues that the political elite invests in
public education and on these investments' eﬀectiveness in reducing the individual cost of educating children.
Thus, we can conclude that, in the presence of elite rivalry, a lower tax rate induces positive changes in all
economic outcomes. Adjusting the tax burden according to changes in the development of the middle class
and the accumulation of human capital can also help balance the economic and political interests of diﬀerent
social groups. In sum, these new results allow us to conclude that a more intensive rate of increase in the
key factors driving economic growth contributes to lowering the degree of elite rivalry and reducing policy
ineﬃciencies in the medium-long term.
The results of our analysis also call for further research and empirical testing. For example, as regards
the emerging economies, the key conclusions of the model imply that in countries where the middle class and
human capital are growing at higher rates, the implemented policies tend to be economically more eﬃcient
and thus more growth-promoting than in countries where their growth rates are lower. Also, the model
implies that there is an inverse relation between the level of taxes and the growth rate of the middle class
and of human capital accumulation. These conclusions could be empirically tested in a cross-country study
focusing mainly on emerging or developing economies, in which elite rivalry issues are more prevalent.
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